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Statement of Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code § 78-2(a)-3(j), as
this case was poured over from the Utah Supreme Court. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2(a)-3(j).
Issues Presented For Review
L

When considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court must

construe all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. In this case, the district
court adopted the moving party's statement of facts wholesale, failed to consider the
additional material facts advanced by the Baldassins, which were uncontroverted by Dr.
Freeman and raised genuine issues of material fact, and failed to construe the facts in a light
most favorable to the Baldassins. Did the district court incorrectly grant summary judgment
against the Baldassins?
This presents an issue of law that is reviewed for correctness. See Traco Steel
Erectors, Inc. v. Comtrol, Inc., 2007 UT App 407, 175 P.3d 572. Specifically, the question
presented is whether the district court erred when it failed to construe the facts in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party, in this case the Baldassins. See Draper City v. Estate of
Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1995); Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rain & Fielding, 909 P'.2d
1283,1292-93 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
2.

Summary judgment cannot be granted if the record reflects a single issue of

material fact regarding the invocation of estoppel, and "reasonable reliance" is a question of
fact. Dr. Freeman admitted his negligence to the Baldassins, and he and his insurer said they

4

would pay the Baldassins' medical expenses and lost income. They did, for a while. The
Baldassins relied on those statements and actions in not filing suit against Dr. Freeman. Dr.
Freeman and his insurer stopped all payments only after the statute of limitations had run.
Did the district court err when it ignored the disputed issue of material fact regarding the
reasonableness of the Baldassins' reliance on Dr. Freeman's statements and actions and
granted summary judgment against the Baldassins?
Whether the district court properly applied the law as to estoppel is a question of law
reviewed for correctness. SeeNunleyv. Westates Casing Servs., Inc., 1999 UT 100, ^[31,
989 P.2d 1077 (reviewing trial court's legal conclusions regarding application of estoppel
doctrine for correctness). In addition, reliance is a question of fact. See, Travelers Insurance
Co. v. Kearl, 896 P.2d 644, 648 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("In addition, while Travelers has
argued that Mr. Kearl's conduct could not equate to reasonable reliance, that question is one
of fact to be determined at trial.").
Each of these issues were preserved in the district court pursuant to the Baldassins'
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment. See R. 214-92.
Determinative Statutory Provisions
The only rules that may be determinative of this appeal are Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure 7 and 56. See Utah R. Civ. P. 7, 56. Each of these rules are provided in their
entirety in the Addendum to this brief.
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Statement of the Case
The facts of this case are set forth in the Baldassins' Memorandum in Opposition to
Motion for Summary Judgment, specifically at R. 217-226, portions of which are quoted
verbatim herein; citations are to the record:
Appellant Rick Baldassin ("Rick") entered Intermountain Surgical Center on May 16,
2003, preparing for a surgical hernia repair that should have lasted less than an hour. R. 217.
Instead, Rick woke up from surgery, recollecting as follows: "I woke up and the attending
nurse said that they were now going to take me to LDS Hospital." When he told the nurse
that his wife was to pick him up, she stated, "Oh, you haven't heard yet? There's been an
accident, and they're transferring you to LDS Hospital." Id.
Appellee Dr. Freeman ("Dr. Freeman") then came to see Rick, "and he told me that,
during the procedure, my colon had been nicked, that he had repaired it, and that he wanted
to keep me in the hospital for a couple of days on antibiotics to have some tests done and for
observation." Id. A few days later, Dr. Freeman again came to see Rick, and told Rick that
he wanted to release him from the hospital. Rick told Dr. Freeman that he did not feel well.
Dr. Freeman told Rick that he should remain at the hospital another day. Id., 217-18. Rick's
condition deteriorated, as he suffered severe abdominal pain and began vomiting bile. Due
to his condition, Rick then had to undergo an exploratory laparotomy on May 22. Id., 218.
During the following week, while Rick was still at the hospital, Dr. Freeman
came to his room and sat beside his bed. He told Rick:
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In a period of time, you're going to be getting a lot of bills as a result of these this extended stay and extra surgeries that we've done, and when you get them,
I want you to collect them all up and bring them to my office, and I'll take care
of them.
Id. Rick told Dr. Freeman that he "would do that." Rick then underwent yet another
surgical procedure on May 28. He was finally released from the hospital on June 11, 2003.
Id. As of September 2004, Rick was still not feeling well. Dr. Freeman informed him that
he would need gallbladder surgery.

Rick had laparoscopic cholecystectomy surgery

performed by Dr. Freeman on September 21, 2004. Rick had additional, related surgical
procedures performed in October 2004, and again in April 2006. Id.
Rick recalled a conversation he had with Dr. Freeman one year after the
original surgery:
A.

I said, you know, it's been a year now since we first met, or not since we first
met, since the first surgery, and he said, Yeah, you have a heck of a scar for a
hernia. And then he said, I've been doing this for thirty years. I should have
known better.

Id, 218-19.
Rick did not instantly file a lawsuit in this matter, as he reasonably believed that Dr.
Freeman had admitted liability to him, and was going to pay his bills.
Q

Okay. When did you first believe that Dr. Freeman had been negligent in his
treatment of you?

A

When he offered to pay.

Q

And when was that?

A

While I was in the hospital in May of 2003.
7

Q

And at that point, you were aware that you had a viable lawsuit or that you had
a potential claim?

A

It didn't really cross my mind. I was more interested in staying alive.

Q

Okay. At some point after your treatment, you were aware that you would
have had an actionable lawsuit at that point. Weren't you aware of that?

A

Because of the way it was handled at the time, it didn't cross my mind.

Id, 219.
In reliance on Dr. Freeman's promise, Rick began collecting his first set of bills and
expenses. He was told by Dr. Freeman to give them to his malpractice insurance agent,
Michael Imbler, at Utah Medical Insurance Association ("UMIA"). Id, 219-20. At Dr.
Freeman's direction, Rick began submitting his first set of bills, expenses and evidence of
lost wages for himself and his wife, either directly to Dr. Freeman, or to Mr. Imbler, prior to
August 2004. Such expenses were paid, either to the Baldassins or to the various entities
owed. Id., 220.
In reliance on Dr. Freeman's promise, Rick again collected and submitted his second
set of bills, expenses and lost wages to Mr. Imbler in or about February 2005.

Such

expenses were again paid, either to the Baldassins or to the various entities owed. Id., 221.
In reliance on Dr. Freeman's promise, Rick again collected and submitted a
third set of bills, expenses and lost wages to Mr. Imbler in or about December 2005. These
items were not paid:
A

In December of 2005, and I told [Imbler] that we had yet additional bills and
claims, and that was when he told me that he was surprised, that he thought
S

that I had gotten better, and I told him that that was not the case. And he said
that he was sorry to hear that and asked me to forward the information to him,
which I believe we did, either by mail or fax . . .
I didn't hear from him for several weeks, contacted him again, I believe, in
January of 2006. He told me that the matter was under review . . . And he said
that an endocrinologist was going to review the case, and he also, at that point,
asked us to send to him certain tax returns. I don't remember which ones, but
whatever they were, I sent them to him.
I didn't hear from him again for a while. The next conversation I had with
him, he said that the amount of money that they had paid out to me now
exceeded the amount that he was authorized to oversee, and that it would have
to go to another level of committee or something. And I didn't hear anything
more from him, and I haven't talked to him since.
Id, 221-22.
In February 2006, Rick saw Dr. Freeman and attempted to gain his assistance
with payment of his medical bills and related expenses. No such assistance was offered:
A.

And I also mentioned to [Dr. Freeman] that the people from UMIA were being
unresponsive to us. And he told me that they didn't feel that my current symptoms
were related to my previous surgeries, and I asked him if there was anything that he
could do to try to persuade them and he said, No.

Id., 222. At that time, two and one half years had passed since Rick's initial surgery. Id.
The Baldassins filed this medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Freeman on or about
November 13, 2006. R. 01-07. On January 9, 2008, Dr. Freeman filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment, requesting dismissal on the basis of expiration of the applicable statute
of limitations. See R. 115-18. The Baldassins opposed this motion, arguing that Dr.
Freeman should be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations based upon his conduct
and the conduct of his insurer. See R. 214-92. On April 22, 2008, the district court entered
9

a Ruling, holding as a matter of law that Dr. Freeman was not estopped from asserting the
statute of limitations. See R. 351-56. The district court entered an Order dismissing the
Baldassins' case on April 29, 2008. See R. 357-59. The Baldassins timely appealed from
the Ruling and Order on May 6, 2008.
Summary of Arguments
1.

When ruling on Dr. Freeman's Motion for Summary Judgment, the district

court failed to liberally construe the facts in favor of the Baldassins. In fact, the district
court essentially ignored the facts presented by the Baldassins altogether. This constitutes
reversible error.
2.

The facts presented to the district court show that genuine issues of material

fact exist regarding whether Dr. Freeman should be estopped from asserting the applicable
statute of limitations, precluding summary judgment.
Argument
THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED
SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
This Court succinctly stated the standard of review regarding a motion tor summary
judgment in Shaw Resources Ltd., L.L.C. v. Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell, P.C., 2006 UT App
313, 142P.3d560:
Summary judgment is appropriate only where "pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with ... affidavits, ... show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
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Id., U 20. &e also Bangerter v. Petty, 2008 UT App 1534 12,184 P.3d 1249 (same); Clover
v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1039 (Utah 1991) ("... the facts are to be liberally
construed in favor of the parties opposing the motion, and those parties are to be given the
benefit of all inferences which might reasonably be drawn from the evidence." (quotations
and citations omitted)); Larson v. WycoffCo., 624 P.2d 1151, 1153 (Utah 1981) ("Because
summary judgment is a harsh remedy which deprives a person of a full trial of his case, this
Court will review the facts in a light most favorable to the party against whom summary
judgment was granted.").

If this Court finds a material factual issue, "we will reverse the

grant of summary judgment." Travelers Ins. Co. v. Kearl, 896 P.2d 644, 646-47 (Utah Ct.
App. 1995) (citations omitted).

I.

The District Court Improperly Ignored the Material Facts Presented by
The Baldassins, Which Raised Genuine Issues of Material Fact.

The district court failed to liberally construe the facts in favor of the Baldassins.
Indeed, the district court largely ignored the facts presented by the Baldassins altogether. In
doing so, it thwarted the letter and intent of Rule 56, denied the Baldassins a trial on the
merits of their claims, and its ruling constitutes reversible error.
Dr. Freeman's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment ("Memo,
in Support") sets forth certain factual allegations. See Memorandum in Support, pp. 4-9;
R. 122-127. Each of these allegations include excerpts from various depositions taken in this
matter. See id. The Baldassins did not directly dispute these allegations, as the allegations
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were simply excerpts from the depositions. Baldassins' Memorandum in Opposition to Dr.
Freeman's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Memo, in Opp.") noted that,
to the extent Defendants simply quote from various deposition transcripts,
[Appellants] do not dispute that those people so testified.... However, Defendants do
not cite all testimony relevant to the disposition of their motion. Therefore,
[Appellants] have set forth the following Additional Material Facts.
Memo, in Opp., pp. 3-4; R. 216-17. The Baldassins then submitted nine pages of additional
material facts. Id., pp. 4-13; R. 217-26. These additional facts demonstrate that a dispute
existed as to whether Dr. Freeman should be estopped from asserting the statute of
limitations. See id. Specifically, these additional facts show that Dr. Freeman admitted
liability for medical negligence to the Baldassins, that he would pay for the Baldassins'
medical expenses and their lost wages, that he directed his malpractice insurer to make those
payments, and then subsequently that, after the requisite statute of limitations had run, he and
his insurer stopped making such payments and denied liability. Dr. Freeman did not address
or attempt to dispute these additional facts. See Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment ("Reply Memo."), R. 297.
The district court essentially ignored the Baldassins' factual allegations, based on the
following analysis:
In the Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, Defendants complied with [Utah R. Civ. P. 7] in setting forth the Statement
of Undisputed Facts. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition did not controvert any
of Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts. Instead, Plaintiffs set forth a
statement of Additional Material Facts as allowed by Rule 7. Because Defendants'
Statement of Undisputed Facts were not controverted, they are deemed admitted for
the purpose of this motion. Rule 7(c)(3)(A). Although Defendants did not controvert
12

the Additional Material Facts of Plaintiffs, Rule 7 is silent as to whether such
statements are deemed admitted.
Ruling, pp. 1-2; R. 351-52.
The district court then set forth its analysis of the "Factual Background" of the case
utilizing, with one exception, only Dr. Freeman's Statement of Facts. See id., pp. 2-3; R.
352-53. Only one fact asserted by the Baldassins was set forth in this analysis. See id., p.3;
R. 353. Because of the district court's failure to consider the Baldassins' additional material
facts in its analysis, the district court concluded that the Baldassins had failed to fulfill, or
raise genuine issues of material fact about, the first element of estoppel as a defense to the
statute of limitations, that is, a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party
inconsistent with the claim later asserted. See, Id., R.353.
There is no legal basis on a motion for summary judgment for ignoring the facts
asserted by the non-moving party and accepting only the facts asserted by the movant.
Indeed, this is the antithesis of the proper analysis:
It is not the purpose of the summary judgment procedure to judge the
credibility of the averments of parties, or witnesses, or the weight of evidence. Neither
is it to deny parties the right to a trial to resolve disputed issues of fact. Its purpose is
to eliminate the time, trouble and expense of trial when upon any view taken of the
facts as asserted by the party ruled against, he would not be entitled to prevail. Only
when it so appears, is the court justified in refusing such a party the opportunity of
presenting his evidence and attempting to persuade the fact trier to his views.
Conversely, if there is any dispute as to any issue, material to the settlement of the
controversy, the summary judgment should not be granted.
Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975). Indeed, "it only takes one sworn
statement under oath to dispute the averments on the other side of the controversy and create
13

an issue of fact," and it is improper for a district court to weigh the evidence before it or
assess credibility. Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983). See Draper City v.
Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1995) ("In granting summary judgment, it
is apparent that the trial court gave more weight to some affidavits than to others. This was
inappropriate at this stage of the litigation. On a motion for summary judgment, a trial court
should not weigh disputed evidence, and its sole inquiry should be whether material issues
of fact exist." (emphasis added)); Kilpatrickv. Wiley, Rain & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283,129293 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (reversing summary judgment where u[t]he trial court improperly
weighed evidence to reach its determination that material issues of fact surrounding causation
were undisputed. The plaintiffs presented evidence that created genuine issues of material
fact; therefore, the trial court inappropriately granted summary judgment.").1
Moreover, there is nothing in Rule 7 that allows a district court to ignore "additional
material facts":
A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall contain a
verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, and may
contain a separate statement of additional facts in dispute. For each of the moving
party's facts that is controverted, the opposing party shall provide an explanation of
the grounds for any dispute, supported by citation to relevant materials, such as

1

The Baldassins submitted to the district court the Declaration of Rick Baldassin, which
completely controverted deposition testimony by Dr. Freeman's insurance adjustor, Michael
Imbler, that Mr. Imbler had discussed the medical malpractice statute of limitations with Rick
Baldassin. This Declaration was attached, unsigned, to the Baldassins' Memorandum in
Opposition, but the signed Declaration was filed with the court, and provided to opposing
counsel, within four days of the Baldassins' Memorandum court filing. Mr. Baldassin's
Declaration raises a clear issue of material fact with regard to reasonable reliance in the context
of the elements of equitable estoppel. His Declaration is attached hereto in the Addendum at IV.
14

affidavits or discovery materials. For any additional facts set forth in the opposing
memorandum, each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by
citation to supporting materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials, (emphasis
added).
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(B). The district court's Ruling renders this section a nullity; there
would be no purpose to allow for "additional material facts" - facts that Dr. Freeman did not
dispute in this case - if a district court could simply ignore the same. See Lyon v. Burton,
2000 UT 19, \19, note 5, 5 P.3d 616 (Utah 2000) (stating courts' duty "to avoid interpreting
a statute in a manner that renders portions of the statute, or related statutes, meaningless.").
Rule 56(e) simply requires that, "[w]hen a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported...the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). The
Baldassins made this showing with their additional material facts, and Rick's Declaration.
Neither Rule 56(e) nor Rule 7 require more.
Because the district court failed from the outset to apply the proper standard on Dr.
Freeman's motion for summary judgment, its Ruling should be reversed. See Draper City,
888 P.2d at 1101 (reversing summary judgment where trial court gave more weight to some
affidavits than others, stating "[fjact-sensitive cases such as this case do not lend themselves
to a determination on summary judgment."); Kilpatrick, 909 P.2d at 1293 (same); Pigs Gun
Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County, 2002 UT 17, ^f 24, 42 P.3d 379 (reversing summary judgment
because "a trial court is not authorized to weigh facts in deciding a summary judgment
motion, but is only to determine whether a dispute of material fact exists.... The trial court
15

did not follow this standard, and thus improperly concluded that no material issues of fact
were disputed.").
II.

The Facts Presented to the District Court Show that Summary Judgment
Was Improperly Granted.

The issue in the underlying lawsuit in this appeal is whether the doctrine of estoppel
should apply to prevent Dr. Freeman from asserting the statute of limitations. Estoppel to
assert the statute of limitations is properly applied when a party "has been induced to refrain
from using such means or taking such action as lay in his power, by which he might have
retrieved his position and saved himself from loss." Rice v. Granite School Dist., 456 P.2d
159, 162-63 (Utah 1969). The Baldassins' Memorandum in Opposition raised questions of
material fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment and have the matter decided by a jury.
The necessary elements of equitable estoppel are:
(1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim
later asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken on the basis
of the first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (3) injury to the
second party that would result from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate
such statement, admission, act, or failure to act.
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Kearl, 896 P.2d 644, 648 (Utah Ct. App.1995). Summary judgment is
improper if the relevant facts relating to equitable estoppel are in dispute. See id. ("Because
evidence properly before the trial court supports each of the elements of equitable estoppel,
we find genuine issues of material fact, thereby precluding the entry of summary judgment
against the intervenors."); United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d
880, 892 (Utah 1993) ("Once again, summary judgment was improperly granted because the
16

record does not reflect undisputed facts which would support the invocation of waiver or
estoppel."). In addition, reliance is a question of fact:
[W]hile Travelers has argued that Mr. Kearl's conduct could not equate to reasonable
reliance, that question is one of fact to be determined at trial. See Berkeley Bank for
Coops, v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798, 801 (Utah mO);Conderv. Williams &Assocs., 739
P.2d 634, 638 (Utah App.1987). We therefore reverse the trial court's grant of
summary judgment against the intervenors and remand for further proceedings on the
issues pertaining to equitable estoppel. The issue of actual reliance and the
reasonableness of the reliance is, of course, for the jury to determine. Berkeley Bank
for Cooperatives v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798, 801 (Utah 1980).
Travelers Ins. Co., 896 P.2d at 648.
Utah law holds that waiver or estoppel "may be found in the face of a mandatory
statute. For instance, statutes of limitation ordinarily are mandatory both in form and effect.
Nevertheless, they may be waived or the party may be estopped from relying upon them."
Ricev. Granite School Dist., 456 P.2d 159(Utah 1969). The basis for this determination was
set forth therein:
Where, as here, the delay in commencing action was induced by the conduct
of the party sought to be charged the latter may not invoke such conduct to defeat
recovery. An estoppel may arise although there was no designed fraud on the part of
the person sought to be estopped. To create an equitable estoppel, it is enough if the
party has been induced to refrain from using such means or taking such action as lay
in his power, by which he might have retrieved his position and saved himself from
loss. It is well settled that a person by his conduct may be estopped to rely upon these
defenses. Where the delay in commencing action is induced by the conduct of the
defendant it cannot be availed of by him as a defense.
Id. at 162-63 (quotations and citations omitted).
In Rice, the Utah Supreme Court specifically addressed whether negotiations for the
compromise of a claim or debt will give rise to an estoppel against pleading the statute of
17

limitations. Id. at 163. The Court stated that the determination "depends upon the character
of the negotiations and the circumstances surrounding the parties." Id. There, the facts
indicated that estoppel should apply:
In the instant action, the facts, as asserted in plaintiffs affidavit,
indicate that the adjuster for the insurance carrier admitted liability and
promised compensation upon several occasions. Plaintiff was led to believe
that the only unresolved issue was the ascertainment of her damages, which
she was informed was contingent solely on her discharge by her doctor. If the
facts be substantiated in plaintiffs affidavit, the trier of fact could reasonably
conclude that the conduct of the adjuster was such as to induce plaintiff to
delay filing her action.
Where the delay in commencing an action is induced by the conduct of the
defendant, or his privies, or an insurance adjuster acting in his behalf, it cannot
be availed of by any of them as a defense.
One cannot justly or equitably lull an adversary into a false sense of security
thereby subjecting his claim to the bar of limitations, and then be heard to
plead that very delay as a defense to the action when brought. Acts or conduct
which wrongfully induce a party to believe an amicable adjustment of his
claim will be made may create an estoppel against pleading the Statute of
Limitations.
Id. (citations omitted).
InHartv. Bridges, 591 P.2d 1172(Okl. 1979), the Oklahoma Supreme Court applied
this same analysis to a personal injury claimant who wished to amend his complaint to
include the allegation that promises to settle by an insurer estopped the defendant from taking
advantage of the statute of limitations. Plaintiff alleged that the defendant's representative
"continually admitted liability to plaintiffs attorney after, as well as before the action was
filed," and that "defendant's insurance carrier promised it would pay plaintiffs claim as soon
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as his damages were determined." Id. at 1174. The court reversed a trial court's refusal to
allow the amendment.
These allegations properly pleaded would be sufficient to raise a fact question as to
whether promises to settle by insurer estop defendant from taking advantage of the
statute of limitations. Mere negotiations of course do not make out a case for estoppel.
Plaintiff must show he relied on the settlement negotiations and that such reliance was
reasonable under the facts of this case, thus inducing him to delay filing suit. One
cannot equitably lull an adversary into a false sense of security, thereby subjecting his
claim lo the bar of limitations and then be heard to plead that very delay as a defense
to the action. Further, where negotiations are conducted by an agent of the defendant,
including a representative of defendant's insurer, negotiations and conduct of the
agent are binding on defendant.
We hold plaintiff should be permitted to amend his petition to allege an estoppel of
defendant to plead the statute of limitations and it was error for trial court to refuse
his request.... It is not necessary to prove defendant intentionally misled plaintiff or
even intended by his conduct to induce delay.
Id. (citations omitted).
Indeed, a multitude of state supreme and appellate courts have held that, where
plaintiff has alleged an insurer's promise to pay or similar conduct, summary judgment was
improper on the issue of estoppel to assert the relevant statute of limitations. See Mandola
v. Mariotti, 557 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Ct App.- Houston 1977) (reversing summary judgment
on statute of limitations claim because material fact existed as to whether insurer's claim
adjuster had told personal injury plaintiff that insurer would take care of all damages);
Sander v. Wright, 394 N.W.2d 896 (S.D. 1986) (reversing summary judgment because issue
of fact existed as to whether conduct of driver's insurance adjuster estopped driver from
asserting statute of limitations); Gagner v. Strekouras, 423 A.2d 1168 (R.I. 1980) (summary
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judgment relying on statute of limitations reversed where personal injury plaintiff alleged that
insurer had assured him that a settlement would be reached); Zaayer v. Edwards, 429 N.E.2d
607 (111. App. Ct. 1981) (dismissal of complaint due to statute of limitations reversed where
plaintiff raised factual issue regarding conduct of defendant's insurance agent, including
advising plaintiff to send all bills and discussing possibility of settlement).
These authorities were cited below. See Memo, in Opp., pp. 11-15; R. 224-28.
However, with little analysis, the district court quickly dismissed them:
Plaintiffs rely on Rice v. Granite School District, 456 P.2d 159 (Utah 1989)
[sic] and Whitaker v. Salt Lake City Corp., 552 P.2d 1252 (Utah 1974).
However, in both of those cases, insurance adjusters had promised and assured
plaintiffs that they would be compensated for their injuries. As such, Rice and
Whitaker do not help Plaintiffs. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not and cannot
meet the first element of estoppel.
Ruling, p.3;R. 353.
This Ruling is insufficient to grant summary judgment. The district court fails to
explain why "Rice and Whitaker do not help Plaintiffs,"2 and provides no analysis to justify
its determination.3
2

The citation recited by the district court, 552 P.2d 1252, reveals a Wyoming case
styled Rodarte v. City ofRiverton, 552 P.2d 1245 (Wyo. 1976). The correct citation is
522 P.2d 1252 (Utah 1974). This case was not cited in the Baldassins' Memorandum in
Opposition. In any event, in Whitaker, the Utah Supreme Court held that whether a party
was estopped to assert the defense of the running of the statute of limitations was a
question of fact, precluding summary judgment. See Whitaker v. Salt Lake City Corp.,
522P.2datl253.
3

The district court, at oral argument, also indicated that it would not be persuaded by
non-Utah cases because they "they all come from states where we don't usually follow -1 mean,
Texas and Rhode Island and South Dakota and Oklahoma." See, April 11, 2008 hearing
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As set forth in the fact section of the Baldassins' Memorandum in Opposition, each
of the elements of estoppel are present in this case; at the very least questions of fact exist,
rendering summary judgment on this issue improper. Dr. Freeman and his insurance
adjustor, Mr. Imbler, made statements and/or admissions that Dr. Freeman had made a
medical mistake, and because of that mistake, they would pay Rick's bills and related
expenses. See Memo, in Opp., pp. 4-9; R. 217-22. Mr. Imbler never discussed with Rick the
requisite statute of limitations deadlines. See, Declaration of Rick Baldassin, R.293. These
actions and omissions are inconsistent with later claims that Dr. Freeman, or his insurance
company, would not make such payments, and would instead assert that the statute of
limitations bars the Baldassins' claims. See id., p. 10; R. 223. Rick did just as Dr. Freeman
told him; he supplied his medical bills and related expenses, including lost income, to Dr.
Freeman and his insurance agent. For a period of time, these bills were paid, and Rick did
not institute a suit against Dr. Freeman. See id., pp. 7-10; R. 220-23. However, when the
statute of limitations lapsed, these payments ceased. See id. Rick was injured when Dr.
Freeman and his insurer changed course and refused to pay Rick for expenses incurred as a
result of Dr. Freeman's admitted negligence. See id. Rick was further injured when Dr.
Freeman asserted the statute of limitations as a defense.
Contrary to the cursory analysis of the district court, Rice and Travelers Ins. Co.,
along with the additional authorities cited herein, make clear that a claim for estoppel arises

transcript at 29-30; R.381.
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in such circumstances. See Rice, 456 P.2d at 163 ("One cannot justly or equitably lull an
adversary into a false sense of security thereby subjecting his claim to the bar of limitations,
and then be heard to plead that very delay as a defense to the action when brought. Acts or
conduct which wrongfully induce a party to believe an amicable adjustment of his claim will
be made may create an estoppel against pleading the Statute of Limitations."); Travelers Ins.
Co., 896 P.2d at 648 ("while Travelers has argued that Mr. Kearl's conduct could not equate
to reasonable reliance, that question is one of fact to be determined at trial."). At a
minimum, the Baldassins raised a question of material fact, rendering summary judgment
improper. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56.
The district court's analysis regarding the second element of estoppel, reasonable
action or inaction, is flawed because it relies entirely on Dr. Freeman's statement of facts,
once again ignoring the facts presented by the Baldassins:
In this case, rather than showing they failed to act on the basis of Dr.
Freeman's conduct, Plaintiffs stated that Dr. Freeman and other told them to
sue him and that the reason they did not sue him was because it would hurt
their high-end piano business if they sued a doctor. Although Plaintiffs now
allege that they relied on Dr. Freeman's conduct, the undisputed evidence is
to the contrary.
Ruling, p.4; R. 354.
This analysis ignores entirely the Baldassins' "Additional Material Facts," specifically
paragraphs 6 through 17, which describe in detail how Rick was led to believe his bills and
expenses would be taken care of, only to have this promise broken once the statute of
limitations expired. See Memo, in Opp., pp. 4-10; R. 217-23. As set forth above, it is
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reversible error to "give more weight to some affidavits than others," Draper City, 888 P.2d
at 1101, or "to weigh facts in deciding a summary judgment motion." Pigs Gun Club, Inc.
v. Sanpete County, 2002 UT 17, f 24, 42 P.3d 379. This is particularly true regarding an
issue as fact dependent as reasonable reliance. See Travelers Ins. Co., 896 P.2d at 648.
Because the district court chose to consider only Dr. Freeman's factual allegations and
ignored the Baldassins' allegations, the Baldassins respectfully request that this Court reverse
the district court's decision granting summary judgment and remand this matter for trial.
CONCLUSION
The district court erred when it granted Dr. Freeman's Motion for Summary
Judgment. The district court failed to liberally construe the facts in favor of the Baldassins,
which facts reflect that Dr. Freeman admitted liabilty for medical negligence to the
Baldassins; admitted that he should pay for the Baldassins' medical expenses and lost wages
the Baldassins incurred as a result of Dr. Freeman's medical negligence; directed his
malpractice insurer to make these payments, which were made until after the statute of
limitations had run; and then reversed course and denied liability and refused to make any
further payments for medical expenses and lost wages to the Baldassins. The facts before the
district court further raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Baldassins
reasonably relied upon Dr. Freeman's earlier actions and statements, and those of his
malpractice insurer, in not bringing a lawsuit until after Dr. Freeman and his malpractice
insurer reversed course and the statute of limitations for a medical malpractice action had
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run.
Accordingly, genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment exist as
to whether Dr. Freeman should be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations. The
Baldassins request that this Court reverse the district court's order granting summary
judgment and allow the Baldassins to present their case to a jury.

DATED this X\

day of August, 2008
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.

Jeffrey
Bradley My^rastetterg
Kay Burningham, Attorney at Law
Attorneys for Appellants

24

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
l-\

I hereby certify that on this /

1l *

day of August, 2008,1 caused two true and correct

copies of the foregoing APPELLANTS' BRIEF to be mailed first class, postage fully prepaid, to the following:
Scott A. DuBois
Peter H. Donaldson
Snell & Wilmer
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1004
Attorneys for Appellees
~ *

/ /

J, \

25

/

ADDENDUM

I.

Rule 7, URCP

II.

Rule 56, URCP

III.

District Court's Ruling on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

IV.

Declaration of Rick Baldassin

26

Rule 6

RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Note 20
60(b), (1), 73(a) Anderson v Anderson, 1955, 3
Utah 2d 277, 282 P 2d 845. Appeal And Error
<3=> 430(2)

PART III. PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS
RULE 7.

PLEADINGS ALLOWED; MOTIONS, MEMORANDA, HEARINGS, ORDERS, OBJECTION TO COMMISSIONER'S ORDER
(a) Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a
counterclaim; an answer to a cross claim, if the answer contains a cross claim;
a third party complaint, if a person who was not an original party is summoned
under the provisions of Rule 14; and a third party answer, if a third party
complaint is served. No other pleading shall be allowed, except that the court
may order a reply to an answer or a third party answer.
(b)(1) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by motion
which, unless made during a hearing or trial or in proceedings before a court
commissioner, shall be made in accordance with this rule. A motion shall be
in writing and state succinctly and with particularity the relief sought and the
grounds for the relief sought.
(b)(2) Limit on order to show cause. An application to the court for an order
to show cause shall be made only for enforcement of an existing order or for
sanctions for violating an existing order. An application for an order to show
cause must be supported by an affidavit sufficient to show cause to believe a
party has violated a court order.
(c) Memoranda.
(c)(1) Memoranda required, exceptions, filing times. All motions, except uncontested or ex parte motions, shall be accompanied by a supporting memorandum. Within ten days after service of the motion and supporting memorandum, a party opposing the motion shall file a memorandum in opposition.
Within five days after service of the memorandum in opposition, the moving
party may file a reply memorandum, which shall be limited to rebuttal of
matters raised in the memorandum in opposition. No other memoranda will
be considered without leave of court. A party may attach a proposed order to
its initial memorandum.
(c)(2) Length. Initial memoranda shall not exceed 10 pages of argument
without leave of the court. Reply memoranda shall not exceed 5 pages of
argument without leave of the court. The court may permit a party to file an
over-length memorandum upon ex parte application and a showing of good
cause.
(c)(3) Content.
(c)(3)(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall
contain a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends no
genuine issue exists. Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and
supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery
58
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materials. Each fact set forth in the moving party's memorandum is deemed
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted by the
responding party.
(c)(3)(B) A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall
contain a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is
controverted, and may contain a separate statement of additional facts in
dispute. For each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, the opposing
party shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute, supported by
citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. For
any additional facts set forth in the opposing memorandum, each fact shall be
separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to supporting materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials.
(c)(3)(C) A memorandum with more than 10 pages of argument shall contain
a table of contents and a table of authorities with page references.
(c)(3)(D) A party may attach as exhibits to a memorandum relevant portions
of documents cited in the memorandum, such as affidavits or discovery materials.
(d) Request to submit for decision. When briefing is complete, either party
may file a "Request to Submit for Decision." The request to submit for decision
shall state the date on which the motion was served, the date the opposing
memorandum, if any, was served, the date the reply memorandum, if any, was
served, and whether a hearing has been requested. If no party files a request,
the motion will not be submitted for decision.
(e) Hearings. The court may hold a hearing on any motion. A party may
request a hearing in the motion, in a memorandum or in the request to submit
for decision. A request for hearing shall be separately identified in the caption
of the document containing the request. The court shall grant a request for a
hearing on a motion under Rule 56 or a motion that would dispose of the
action or any claim or defense in the action unless the court finds that the
motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or the issue has been authoritatively decided.
(f) Orders.
(f)(1) An order includes every direction of the court, including a minute order
entered in writing, not included in a judgment. An order for the payment of
money may be enforced in the same manner as if it were a judgment. Except
as otherwise provided by these rules, any order made without notice to the
adverse party may be vacated or modified by the judge who made it with or
without notice. Orders shall state whether they are entered upon trial, stipulation, motion or the court's initiative.
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial
memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party
shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other parties
a proposed order in conformity with the court's decision. Objections to the
proposed order shall be filed within five days after service. The party prepar59
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ing the order shall file the proposed order upon being served with an objection
or upon expiration of the time to object
(f)(3) Unless otherwise directed by the court, all orders shall be prepared as
separate documents and shall not incorporate any matter by reference
(g) Objection to court commissioner's recommendation. A recommendation
of a court commissioner is the order of the court until modified by the court A
party may object to the recommendation by filing an objection in the same
manner as filing a motion withm ten days after the recommendation is made in
open court or if the court commissioner takes the matter under advisement,
ten days after the minute entry of the recommendation is served A party may
respond to the objection in the same manner as responding to a motion
[Amended effective November 1, 2003, April 1 2004, November 1 2005, April 1,
2008]
Advisory Committee Note
The practice for courtesy copies varies
by judge and so is not regulated by rule
Each party should ascertain w h e t h e r the
judge wants a courtesy copy of that party s
motion m e m o r a n d a and supporting docu

ments and, if so w h e n and where to dehver them
p a r a g r a p h (f) applies to all orders, not
o n k r s
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Rule 56

IDGMENT

of a clear abuse of discretion. Rules Civ.Proc,
Rule 60(b). Pitman v. Bonham, 1984, 677 P.2d
1126. Appeal And Error @=> 957(1); Judgment
<3=>139
Trial court has considerable discretion in ruling on motion to set aside default judgment and
^proceedings after opening default, openSupreme Court will reverse trial court only
Eft ing or setting aside default judgment
where clear abuse of discretion is shown.
laternity action was remanded for an evidenRules Civ.Proc, Rule 60(b). Gardiner and
.hearing on damages, at which hearing
Gardiner Builders v. Swapp, 1982, 656 P.2d
Imitative father, whose motion to set aside the
429. Appeal And Error <3> 957(1); Judgment
plSJwilt judgment entered against him was de<3=> 139
itied was entitled to appear and defend with
Whether a trial court should set aside a decounsel, since the amount of damages requested
neither a sum certain nor a sum readily fault judgment is largely a discretionary matter,
.jculable, and trial court had not taken evi- and appellate court will reverse court's ruling
lifence as to the reasonableness of the amount only if it is clear the court abused that discre*fore. entering default judgment against puta- tion. Heath v. Mower, 1979, 597 P.2d 855.
* 'father.' Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 55(b)(2), Appeal And Error <$=* 957(1); Judgment <$=> 139
j ^ J - L a r s e n v. Collina, 1984, 684 P.2d 52.
Trial court has a discretion in determining
Ildren Out-of-wedlock <S=> 73
whether to set aside a default judgment, and
IVVhere a default judgment is expunged for determination should only be reversed for an
' ~ jflidity. for failure to verify the complaint, abuse of discretion that is arbitrary, capricious,
Jntiff may, on notice to defendant, be permit- or not based on adequate findings of fact or on
to amenci the complaint by adding the verifi- law. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 60(b). PaBton. -Franklin v. Thatcher, 1919, 53 Utah cer Sport & Cycle, Inc. v. Myers, 1975, 534 P.2d
$7<f178 P/922. Judgment <&> 176
616. Appeal And Error <£=> 957(1); Judgment
^Review/opening or setting aside default <£=> 139
Whether default judgment should be relieved
|V£>j judgment
il,'court's ruling on motion to set aside lies within discretion of trial court and its disaiilt involves trial court's discretionary pow- cretion^ will riot be disturbed unless there is a
,'atid1 Court of Appeals will not disturb trial - patent abuse thereof. Board of Ed. of Granite
irVs decision in such matters absent clear School Dist. v. Cox, 1963,. 14 Utah 2d 385, 384
of, discretion. Miller v. Brocksmith, P.2d 806. Appeal And Error <s> 957(1); Judgment ®=» 139
Mtef'825.P.*2d 690. Appeal And Error <£=>
P57(l)f J u d g m e n t s 139
"' ;
Relief from default judgment on grounds of
%\ is largely within the discretion of the trial inadvertence and excusable neglect is discrefCfcourt to set aside a judgment which has been tionary, and in absence of a clear abuse of
^entered on a party's default and, while this discretion trial court will not be reversed.
Indiscretion should be liberally exercised in favor Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 60(b). Masters v.
" £,the a defaulting party, decision of the trial LeSeuer, 1962, 13 Utah 2d 293, 373 P.2d 573.
)irt will not be reversed on appeal in absence Appeal And Error <3=* 957(2); Judgment <2=> 139
f ^cel from the trial is sustained, it is not
'"'to also'order a new trial without request
£-'"for since another decree could not be ena ^Jthout a new trial. Thomas v. Morris,
[§2 8 Utah 284, 31 P. 446. Judgment <£=> 164

P U L E 56.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

|a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
s-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
piration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a
jgQtion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary
pigment upon all or any part thereof.
.$&' ^ o r defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
IprQss-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
pve for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof.
fclcj Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits
IB?" ° e i n accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if
p , Pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
f tner w ith the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
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material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a j u d g m e n t as a matter of
law. A s u m m a r y judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of
damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion u n d e r this rul e
j u d g m e n t is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 1
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy } ,
a n d what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action
as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed
established, a n d the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. S u p p o r t i n g !
and opposing affidavits shall be m a d e on personal knowledge, shall set forth
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that
the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or J
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be S
attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to bef*
supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further
affidavits. When a motion for s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t is m a d e and supported as]
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations .^
or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise M
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a |
genuine issue for trial. S u m m a r y judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered "
against a party failing to file such a response.
'1
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a Jj
party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by J
affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the ~?
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such |£
other order as is just.
'&
'-'r
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant \',
to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the .:K
court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party ^f
the a m o u n t of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, v
including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may .^
be adjudged guilty of contempt.
;4
[Amended effective November 1, 1997; November 1, 2004.]
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

RICK BALDASSIN and CINDY
BALDASSIN,
1
Plaintiffs,

RULING ON DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

vs.
JAN S. FREEMAN, M.D. and JAN S.
FREEMAN, M.D., P.C.
Defendants.

Civil No. 060700579
Judge Thomas L. Kay

This case is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment heard on April 11, 2008. Jeffrey R. Oritt appeared for Plaintiffs and
Scott A. Dubois appeared for Defendants. Following a thorough review of the
pleadings relating to this motion, and the arguments of counsel, and good cause
appearing, the Court now issues its ruling.
I. Factual Background
In the Memorandum in Support of Defendants'Motion for Summary
Judgment, Defendants complied with Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
in setting forth the Statement of Undisputed Facts. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in
Opposition did not controvert any of Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts.
Instead, Plaintiffs set forth a statement of Additional Material Facts as allowed by
Rule 7. Because Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts were not
controverted, they are deemed admitted for the purpose of this motion. Rule 7
(c)(3)(A). Although Defendants did not controvert the Additional Material Facts
of Plaintiffs, Rule 7 is silent as to whether such statements are deemed admitted.
Ruling on defendants' motion for summary judgment
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The incontroverted facts from Defendants' memorandum show that
following a surgical hernia repair on May 16, 2003, Rick Baldassin was told that
there had been an accident and that he was being transferred to the LDS Hospital.
(Para. 3). That same day, Dr. Freeman told Plaintiff and his wife that he had
nicked plaintiffs colon. (Para. 4-5). Sometime between May 22, 2003 and May
28, 2003, Dr. Freeman asked Plaintiff to collect the bills and bring them to him so
that he could take care of them. (Para. 10).
In his discussions with Plaintiff, Dr. Freeman never agreed to pay any
specific sum of money or to make payments for a specific amount of time, nor did
he ever offer to pay medical bills in exchange for an agreement not to sue him.
(Para. 11). Plaintiff believed that Dr. Freeman had been negligent in his treatment
of Plaintiff while he was in the hospital in May of 2003. (Para. 13). On May 22,
2003, Dr. Freeman told Plaintiffs wife that "you need to sue me" in reference to
Plaintiffs medical situation. Dr. Freeman frequently told the Plaintiffs that they
needed to sue him. However, plaintiffs did not think it was appropriate to sue Dr.
Freeman. (Para. 14). While Plaintiff was in the hospital in 2003, he and his wife
were repeatedly told by others, in addition to Dr. Freeman, that they had an
actionable lawsuit. (Para. 15). When Plaintiffs' wife told Dr. Freeman that others
had said that they should sue him, Dr. Freeman responded, "you're right." (Para.
16). The Plaintiffs never told Dr. Freeman that they would not file a lawsuit
against him, nor did Dr. Freeman ever ask them to sign any kind of release of
liability. (Para. 17).
In an attempt to coordinate payment of certain of Plaintiff s medical bills,
Dr. Freeman referred Plaintiff to Mike Imbler, a representative of Dr. Freeman's
insurance earner. (Para. 19). Plaintiff had no agreement with Mr. Imbler that he
would be paid in exchange for a promise not to sue Dr. Freeman, nor did Mr.
Imbler ever agree that Plaintiff would be paid a specific amount for medical costs
or other costs. (Para 21). In Mr. Imbler's first meeting with the Plaintiffs, on
September 15, 2003, Mr. Imbler obtained Plaintiffs authorization to release
medical records. At that time, he also explained to Plaintiffs that the statute of
limitations is two years where they would have to either perfect their claim or file
a lawsuit against Dr. Freeman if the claim was not settled by then. (Para 22). In
response, Plaintiffs wife said that they couldn't file a lawsuit against a physician
because that would not be good for their business. (Para. 23). Dr. Freeman's
insurance carrier made no payments for any amounts after February 2005. (Para.
26).
2

The Additional Material Facts from Plaintiffs' Memorandum show that in a
conversation one year after the original surgery Dr. Freeman told Plaintiff, "Yeah,
you have a heck of a scar for a hernia. And then he said, I've been doing this for
thirty years. I should have known better." (Para. 9).
II. Legal Analysis
In order to establish estoppel as a defense to the statute of limitations, a
party must prove each of the following elements:
1. A statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a
claim later asserted;
2. Reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken on the basis of the first
party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and
3. Injury to the second party that would result from allowing the first party to
contradict or repudiate the statement, admission, act, or failure to act.
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Kearl. 896 P2d 644, 647 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
Defendants contend that the undisputed facts show that Plaintiffs cannot
establish either of the first two elements of estoppel. As to the first element, the
undisputed facts are that Defendants paid for two sets of bills, that Dr. Freeman
told plaintiffs (1) that he nicked the colon, (2) that he should have known better,
and (3) that they should sue him.
None of these acts or statements is inconsistent with Dr. Freeman asserting
the statute of limitations in this case. Indeed, telling the Plaintiffs that they should
sue him is consistent, not inconsistent, with asserting the statute of limitations.
These acts or statements did not contain an admission and made no promise to
pay. See McKinnon v. Tambrands, Inc., 815 F. Supp. 415 (D. Utah 1993).
Plaintiffs rely on Rice v. Granite School District 456 P.2d 159 (Utah 1989)
and Whitaker v. Salt Lake City Corp., 552 P.2d 1252 (Utah 1974). However, in
both of those cases, insurance adjustors had promised and assured plaintiffs that
they would be compensated for their injuries. As such, Rice and Whitaker do not
help Plaintiffs. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not and cannot meet the first element
of estoppel.
Because the first element has not been met, Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment is granted for Plaintiffs' failure to establish the first element
3

of estoppel. As an additional and alternative ground in granting Defenants'
Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court will address the second element.
As to this second element, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that there
must be proof of "reasonable action of inaction by the [party claiming estoppel]
taken or not taken on the basis of the [opposing] party's statement, admission, act,
or failure to act." CECO v. Concrete Specialists. Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969 (Utah
1989). Or as Judge Winder stated in McKinnon, "In other words, the party
claiming estoppel must show (1) that it acted or failed to act con the basis' of the
opposing party's conduct, and (2) that its action or inaction was reasonable under
the circumstances."
In this case, rather than showing they failed to act on the basis of Dr.
Freeman's conduct, Plaintiffs stated that Dr. Freeman and others told them to sue
him and that the reason they did not sue him was because it would hurt their highend piano business if they sued a doctor. Although Plaintiffs now allege that they
relied on Dr. Freeman's conduct, the undisputed evidence is to the contrary.
Accordingly, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted for Plaintiffs'
failure to establish the second element of estoppel.
Plaintiffs cite cases from other jurisdictions to argue that summary judgment
should be denied. None of these cases are controlling nor helpful because of their
different factual settings. However, one of the principles from these cases is that
"settlement negotiations can bring on an estoppel if they are accompanied by
certain statements or conduct calculated to lull the claimant into a reasonable
belief that his claim will be settled without suit." Gagner v. Strekouras, 423 A.2d
1168 (R.I. 1980). Or as stated in Hart v. Bridges. 591 P.2d 1172 (Okla. 1979),
"One cannot equitably lull an adversary into a false sense of security, thereby
subjecting his claim to the bar of limitations and then be heard to plead that very
delay as a defense to the action." These cases do not help Plaintiffs. Rather than
lulling them into a false sense of security, Dr. Freeman told Plaintiffs to sue him.
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III. Conclusion
Based upon the foregoing, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is
granted.

Dated this 2 ^ day of April, 2008.
BY THE COURT:

<dumi^^^
Thomas L. Kay
District Judge
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RICK BALDASSIN and CINDY
BALDASSIN,
1

DECLARATION OF
RICK BALDASSIN

Plaintiffs,
vs.
JAN S FREEMAN, M.D., individually, JAN
S. FREEMAN, M.D., P.C., a Utah
professional corporation, and DOES 1-20,
1

Case No. 060604224
Judge Thomas L. Kay

Defendants.

I, Rick Baldassin, hereby declare as follows:
1.

I am over 18 years of age and am competent to testify in a court of law.

2.

I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein.

3.

When my deposition was taken in this litigation on August 14-15, 2007,1 was

asked about conversations that I had with Mike Imbler of UMIA. I was not asked, during that
questioning, whether Mr. Imbler discussed with me the statute of limitations for me to file a
medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Freeman, or statutes of limitation in general.
4.

At no time during any discussions I had at any time with Mr. Imbler did Mr.

Imbler discuss with me anything about a statute of limitations deadline concerning my filing a
lawsuit against Dr. Freeman or when I would have to perfect my claim against Dr. Freeman if
things were not resolved with UMIA by a certain time.
5.

During my initial discussion with Mr. Imbler, I asked him how long, once I

provided documentation to him of medical out of pocket expenses and lost wages, it usually took
for those expenses and claims to be paid by UMIA. I never asked him how long I had to pursue
legal action against Dr. Freeman in any manner.
I declare, under criminal penalty of the State of Utah, that the foregoing is true and
correct,
DATED this 6 ^

day of February, 2008.

rack Baldassin
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